## Exhibit 44

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GAK5cftC 1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 2 3 U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION, 4 Plaintiff, New York, N.Y. 5 13 Civ. 1174 (VSB) v. 6 WILLIAM BYRNES, et al., 7 Defendants. 8 9 October 20, 2016 11:45 a.m. 10 Before: 11 12 HON. VERNON S. BRODERICK, 13 District Judge 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

1	APPEARANCES
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(Case called)

THE DEPUTY CLERK: Counsel, please state your appearance for the record.

Number one, it occurred to me fairly far into this case -- I didn't know -- so, there are a lot of people who are actually familiar faces but I had actually done some work for NYMEX back in 2008, it amounted to 4.8 hours over two days in April -- April 14th and 15th of 2008. I had asked -- once it came to me that I had done some work I asked my former firm, Weil Gotshal, to run a search of the various names that appear, that are relevant in this case, and none of the names popped up. So, the information predates, as least as far as I know, predates anything having to do with this case so I don't think there is an issue but I am raising it for the parties just so that -- obviously, you folks know a lot more about the case than I do but my reading of the case is that any of the activity occurred after the 2008 time period.

The second thing is, and I am not sure whether this is something — I think this is the first time we are meeting face to face. I have worked with both Mr. Fitzgerald and Mr. Shechtman at the U.S. Attorney's office. Mr. Shechtman was Chief of the Criminal Division for a number of years while I was in the office. Mr. Fitzgerald and I worked as line assistants together. I don't think we ever had any cases

together. Again, I don't think that is an issue. I just couldn't remember whether that is something that had come up previously. And I think, am I correct, Mr. Shechtman, that you only recently appeared for Mr. Eibschutz; is that right?

MR. SHECHTMAN: I think I have been active only recently, your Honor. I think that's fair to say.

THE COURT: Okay. I apologize now because I don't think we went through and had everybody identify themselves for the record. First of all, does anybody have any issue with the disclosure that I have made? Obviously do your research and if there is something, just bring it to my attention.

MR. CHUDY: Good afternoon, your Honor. Patryk Chudy for the CFTC. We don't foresee any issues with the disclosures you have and I understand you also worked with our Director of Enforcement Aitan Goelman.

THE COURT: Oh, yes, I forgot about Aitan -- as did some of these folks here also. Yes, that's right. Mr. Goelman and I, just to give a little bit more color with regard to Mr. Goelman, Mr. Goelman -- I was Chief of the Violent Gangs Unit and Mr. Goelman was line assistant in that unit so I supervised him and the cases he worked on. Again, I don't view that as an issue, but thank you for bringing that to my attention. I had forgotten about that.

MR. CHUDY: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay, and it is Mr. MacGregor?

MR. MacGREGOR: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: For the defense? You can go whichever side wants to go first.

MR. ABERNETHY: Your Honor, Samuel Abernethy for Mr. Curtin. We have no objection with the disclosures you just made.

MR. JACKOWSKI: Wojciech Jackowski, also of Menaker & Herrmann for defendant Curtin.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. FITZGERALD: Good afternoon, your Honor. Pat Fitzgerald joined by Marcella Lape and Albert Hogan from Skadden Arps, and no objection. Thanks.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. SHECHTMAN: Paul Schechtman for Mr. Eibschutz. No objection.

MR. ALLGOR: Your Honor, Joseph Allgor for Defendant William Byrnes. No objection.

THE COURT: Obviously if that changes, as I mentioned, that's fine. Just let me know. And if you want to work out a procedure such that I don't, if there is some issue such that I don't know what parties are raising the issue, speak to each other and come out with a process. My understanding is sometimes when this happens it is done just to avoid any issues. So, feel free to do it anonymously, for lack of a better term.

Let me review for the parties the documents I have in connection with today's pre-motion conference. I have the October 10th letter from the CFTC. I have responses from Mr. Byrnes on the 13th of October, from NYMEX on the 13th of October, and from Mr. Curtin on the 13th of October. I also have Defendants Byrnes and Curtin premotion letter which is on, again, October 10th for both Mr. Byrnes and Curtin; and the CFTC's response on October 13th; and NYMEX' pre-motion letter on the 10th and CFTC's response on the 13th.

Am I missing any correspondence in connection with today's conference?

MR. CHUDY: No, your Honor.

MR. FITZGERALD: No.

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THE COURT: All right. I do have some questions.

Often one of the rationales for having a pre-motion conference is to sort of vet and hopefully provide some direction to the parties concerning where I think there may be certain legal issues that I would like the parties to focus on. But, as I understand it, let me first address, I noted in Mr. Curtin's response that there was an assertion that the information that he disclosed was not public.

Is that an accurate assessment or statement?

MR. ABERNETHY: That's accurate, your Honor.

Would you like me to stand?

THE COURT: This goes for everyone: You can stand or

remain seated, but the only thing I ask is that if you stand or remain seated that you pull the microphone close to you so that the court reporter can take down everything.

MR. ABERNETHY: That would be difficult for me, your Honor, if I were to remain standing.

THE COURT: Yes. So that's fine. You can do it from a seated position. I just ask that you pull the microphone close to you.

Just explain for me, because as I was reading the letter it references that it was information that was public but then it references that it was the expert that had been retained by you that at least provided some of that information. I just want to get a sense of what the argument would be and then get the CFTC's response because, obviously, if it is considered public information, that creates an issue.

Go ahead.

MR. ABERNETHY: Our client is in the unique position of the trade information that was disclosed by Mr. Curtin having been about trades that were brokered, that is a voice broker function as an intermediary between traders and potential traders prior to a trade having been disclosed. In that process the information about the trade is well known in the marketplace and because of that, we maintain, and as explained by our client's expert Mr. Silvay, we think we are in a position to argue that there should be summary adjudication

on the grounds that this information was public.

Perhaps I can spend a moment or so to explain how the over-the-counter market operates. Would that be useful to the Court?

THE COURT: In particular, in connection with your phrase "well known in the marketplace," what does that actually mean?

MR. ABERNETHY: Well, the information either was known, that is, the information about the trade, the price, the quantity and the party that traded was either known or was readily available in the marketplace. Let me take a moment to describe the operation of the over-the-counter market.

It is not a centralized marked with a bricks and mortar presence. It is one in which traders are at their offices and they communicate with each other by telephone either directly or through the use of brokers who are known as voice brokers. Voice brokers will call around to solicit interest in a trade to multiple parties and in that process they will often disclose, usually disclose either in that solicitation process or at a later date, the identity of the party involved. There are various reasons why the identity needs to be known. A trading firm may have some restrictions on how many trades or how large a position they can have opposite a given firm. Ultimately they may have concern about whether or not the counter-party is creditworthy.

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So, the identity of a party is circulated in the marketplace through this over-the-counter brokering process. And, accordingly, when a trade is consummated in this relatively small, professional market of natural gas and commodities traders, the information is known -- the identity, the price, the structure, and so on. And, if it isn't known by a particular trader, it can be readily available which is part of the definition of "available to the public." And our expert Mr. Silvay has explained that process. This is a commercially necessary component of the operation of the over-the-counter market. Our client is in the unique position of having given out information that relates only to broker trades. It is also possible in the over-the-counter market that principals can talk directly to each other and consummate a trade. And in those circumstances, the information may or may not get around in the marketplace.

So, it is our contention that this information is in the marketplace and therefore it is public and available to the traders in the marketplace.

THE COURT: Well, in connection with any -- because I didn't see any and I apologize if I missed it -- case law in connection with that, in other words, what does the case law say in terms of -- in this type of situation because, as I understand it, it is not from your description and from my reading of the letters it is not, for example, would I be able

to go or would any individual in the public be able to go and get access to the information?

MR. ABERNETHY: This is a professional — first of all, to respond to your comment about case law, I'm not aware of any case law that addresses this particular issue.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ABERNETHY: This is a professionals market. The relevant trading population is this group of people who are industry professionals. As a practical matter, I don't think you would be recognized by other participants in the market as somebody that they would want to trade against so I think in the over-the-counter market as opposed to Globex Electronic Market operated by the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, I think in this market realistically you would not be a participant in it.

THE COURT: So, I guess one of the issues that I would like, obviously, is to just check to see whether either necessarily in this industry but by analogy in another industry where Courts have discussed what is considered non-public information to determine whether or not this either fits within or is outside of that information. I understand that you are currently not aware of any case law. I am going to ask the CFTC a similar question.

MR. ABERNETHY: I am familiar with the Mylett case which deals with rumor in the marketplace but that is just that, it is rumor, it is not commercially necessary, and I

would distinguish that case from our situation.

THE COURT: Yes. Okay.

Let me hear from the CFTC on this particular issue.

MR. CHUDY: Thank you, your Honor. Patryk Chudy again.

Your Honor, I think it is useful to point out a couple of issues again which are not disputed. There is no dispute that this information that Eibschutz was obtaining from Curtin was not generally disseminated or published by NYMEX or anywhere else. Eibschutz admitted that the information that he was requesting for Curtin was non-public and repeatedly kept asking for the information from Curtin as well as Byrnes because he had no other source to obtain.

The mere fact that someone might be able to make a few phone calls and try to see if people will tell him or advise of some market rumors does not make that information generally available to the trading public. We do believe this case is more akin to a situation where there is some information, some leaks or some rumors out in the market which does not take it out of the category of non-public. What is more important to look at, your Honor, is the fact that Curtin and Byrnes worked at the Exchange and had the direct information and can definitively confirm or deny whether the trades took place. And the case law, your Honor, I think gives great weight to the fact that insiders have that information as opposed to other

rumors in the market.

Similar to what my defense counsel was suggesting, we are not aware of any case law that would support their argument that in this small, professionalized market that the ability to make some phone calls and maybe find out, maybe not find out, rises to the level of public information.

THE COURT: Although you are not aware of any information that supports it, are you aware of case law that suggests that simply that that would not qualify as publicly available information? In other words, by analogy.

MR. CHUDY: I think the Mylett case that we cited, your Honor, is what we would rely on.

THE COURT: The next question I have relates to what is the CFTC's position with regard to the -- on the vicarious liability issue with regard to NYMEX and what evidence would you point to sort of demonstrate that Messrs. Byrnes and Curtin were, that they were doing this, at least in part, for NYMEX.

MR. CHUDY: Your Honor, as you point out, as provided there is at least a mixed motive that the disclosure served any purpose of NYMEX, then vicarious liability attaches and the discovery record has shown that Byrnes and Curtin were repeatedly providing this information to Eibschutz while at their work stations, during regular business hours, on recorded lines that at some point they learned were recorded by NYMEX, using NYMEX computer systems and, in addition, Byrnes, for

example, in response to a NYMEX request to admit later in the litigation indicated the information was disclosed to Eibschutz "for the purpose of assisting Ron Eibschutz in building his book of bills." They did not say, hey, I did this solely for my only personal motives or for, unrelated to NYMEX' business.

THE COURT: I guess my question is Eibschutz -- how do you pronounce his name?

MR. SHECHTMAN: I think that's fine, your Honor.

THE COURT: So, Mr. Eibschutz is providing information so that he could benefit? How does that — in other words, I know there is reference to fees that NYMEX would have gotten but how does the statement — let's assume that Mr. Byrnes provided Mr. Curtin the information to assist Mr. Eibschutz in his business, in other words the cold calls and to get additional work. How is that — and I recognize that that might generate fees for NYMEX but how is that — is there any other way that you are asserting that NYMEX was benefiting?

MR. CHUDY: Yes, your Honor; there is also a statement which we referenced in our October 13th letter by Mr. Byrnes where he had indicated in testimony in connection with an unemployment hearing that he was told he could help the customers and brokers with the questions that they had. So, as we cited in that letter, helping NYMEX establish and bolster their relationship with brokerage houses serves as an objective of NYMEX. Also, as we cited in our letter, there is another

example in the record where another marketing employee, for example, was asked for confidential trade information by a market participant. Now, this individual, by contrast, declined to give out that information and the response that he heard was, come on, I'm trying to help you grow your business.

So, by virtue of helping establish that brokerage relationship that serves a purpose of NYMEX and we submit that even if there was some personal motivation involved in Byrnes and Curtin's disclosures, that doesn't take it outside the scope of employment.

THE COURT: What did they say? In other words what did Mr. Byrnes and Curtin say -- well, were they asked -- because, as I understand it, it sounds like it is conceded -- well, is it conceded that both Mr. Byrnes and Curtin understood, putting aside whether or not that what they were doing was a violation of the NYMEX rules? In other words, did they, during their depositions or otherwise, did they concede that they were concerned or at least knew that this could jeopardize their jobs?

MR. CHUDY: From our reading, your Honor, yes, we think it was, but if counsel has other views we are certainly welcome to hear that.

THE COURT: Let me just check. Does any defense counsel have any other views as to -- and obviously you don't have the record in front of you and you are going to be

preparing your motion so I understand, I'm not going to hold you to it, but I just want, for purposes of today, does anybody have any information that would suggest that that wasn't the case?

Mr. Fitzgerald?

MR. FITZGERALD: As I understand it they were aware that what they were doing was against the policy of NYMEX.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. FITZGERALD: And to the dispositive question of what their intent was -- I hope I quote it correctly -- my understanding is they made an admission that this was not -- it was done not for the purpose of conferring a benefit on NYMEX.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. FITZGERALD: So, we think it is clear that it wasn't done for that purpose and we think that's the dispositive question.

THE COURT: I think the issue then, counsel, because obviously you have the testimony of the individuals who are defendants in this case so I think that's a piece of the information, but what does the law say in terms of vicarious liability in this situation?

The mere fact that in other words they utilized the phone system, in other words if any time, I guess, an employee takes an act whether disclosing information and they're at work, they're utilizing the systems of their employer, it seems

to me that would be -- it can't -- well. I would be skeptical and I would have to see case law that says that that is sufficient. And the question is what would be sufficient and does the mere fact that as an incident to providing the information that Mr. Eibschutz may have then done more business and therefore generated fees, is that sufficient?

So, I really, what I need to see is case law that sort of outlines exactly what would be necessary because I am skeptical that the mere fact that they utilized that they were at work and utilized the facilities of their employer, that that would be sufficient. It may be in combination with some other things, it might be, but juxtaposed against that, as I heard from Mr. Fitzgerald, it sounds as if they both concede that they were concerned for their — when they were disclosing the information, they were concerned about their jobs and that they may have actually — and again, subsequently, indicated that they were doing it, and I don't know what the — I'm not sure — not for NYMEX, Mr. Fitzgerald was that?

MR. FITZGERALD: Not for the benefit of NYMEX.

THE COURT: Not for the benefit of NYMEX.

So, I need to see information that sort of counters that aspect of it. Well, are you aware of any case law discussing the issue of what role — the fact that the employee utilized phone system and the like and the fact that it was recorded, people often do things against their interest even

though it is being recorded or even televised and I won't say anything further. So, to my mind, that isn't necessarily -- it might be some sort of indication but it certainly wouldn't carry the day.

So, are you aware of any sort of the case law discussing this issue in particular when are you talking about vicarious liability?

MR. CHUDY: Yes, your Honor. If I just may respond to a few points as well?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. CHUDY: Our argument is not based solely on the fact that they were doing it during regular business hours on recorded lines. That certainly is a component of it. Our argument is that based on a totality of the circumstances including statements made by Byrnes and Curtin during the course of their employment that they — both — objective evidence shows that they were serving, indeed, some purpose of NYMEX and I think that is established in the discovery record by other witnesses who show that deepening this relationship has a benefit for NYMEX.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. CHUDY: And the fact that they received fees, I think that is again undisputed. It is again undisputed that Byrnes and Curtin were aware that Parity was a top 50 customer, again relevant to their state of mind at the time rather than

what they are saying three, four years later in response to a request to admit served by a co-defendant.

There is a case I can cite to you, Judge, which talks about looking at objective evidence and I will give you the case cite. It is not in our letters but if your Honor would like that I am happy to provide that.

THE COURT: That's fine. Why don't -- if you have the cite you might as well put it in the record. I expect that I will see it in your papers.

MR. CHUDY: Gibbs v. City of New York, 714 F.Supp.2d 419 (E.D.N.Y. 2010), and in that case the Court had held the test must be an objective, not a subjective one. They were analyzing the query of whether conduct was inside the scope of employment under New York Law in that instance.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SHECHTMAN: Judge, obviously the vicarious liability issue isn't mine but I might just say that from my client's point of view and I think the deposition shows this, the last thing in the world he thought was this is for the benefit of NYMEX. He was surprised, pleasantly surprised when he got this information. As you may know, he used it to yell at people on his desk to say, How come we didn't make that trade? Why did they trade away from us? He used it unsuccessfully to try to cold call. His book was not built up but I assume even if he had gotten the trade it is a zero sum

game and somebody else would have.

So, I don't quite understand the argument that this was all about fees. So, I think when you look at this record -- I like these guys, I think when you look at this record you are going to find very little evidence of it being done on my side or on theirs for the benefit of NYMEX.

THE COURT: Okay. Let me ask this, Mr. Shechtman, while you are up.

What was the relationship, because I saw a reference that I thought that Mr. Eibschutz and Mr. Byrnes and Curtin were friends. I don't know. What does that mean? In other words, were they in fact friends or was it basically business associates?

MR. SHECHTMAN: They were not close friends. They may have attended a few sporting events together. I think the record is they may have never been at each other's houses. They knew of each other's families and said how are the kids. And I think even before their time they engaged in locker room conversation. But, I think you will not find this in any way a kind of close, personal friendship.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. CHUDY: Your Honor, may I just respond very briefly to one point?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. CHUDY: There is points about the record that I

think we would disagree on, a full record, of course.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. CHUDY: But I would like to point out the relevant question is whether Byrnes and Curtin were serving any purpose of NYMEX, not what Eibschutz thought Byrnes and Curtin were doing.

MR. SHECHTMAN: And I recognize that, your Honor.

THE COURT: Look. I don't know what the record is.

It could be, though, that some of that occurred in the conversations that they had. In other words, when they were talking about what was going on there could be indicia of, one way or the other, and I don't know what the record is in that regard but let me ask Mr. Shechtman, do you have a, is it a dog in this race? In other words, I didn't get any letters from you so I was just wondering where you stand on this.

MR. SHECHTMAN: Judge, I am in this unusual position and every counsel knows this -- my client's employer has stopped paying him. He has got no contractual entitlement through indemnification and I have stuck with him through thick and thin. We are now very much at thin and he's judgment proof, as far as I can tell, and I am just not going to walk away from him. He is going through health scares and the like.

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. SHECHTMAN: These guys all seem to be very good lawyers. I am likely to file --

THE COURT: A me too?

MR. SHECHTMAN: A me too. If I they miss something — which I doubt — I will file, but I can tell you from my client's point of view if the issue was, was this for trading that certainly wasn't his purpose, and I think he has testified that he finds it, as a market participant, hard to think that anybody would have traded on this.

So, he is a strong believer in the lack of materiality and if that's not made clear in these briefs we will submit something short.

THE COURT: I can't imagine that it wouldn't be based upon the letters but let me ask this because that's a good segue into the materiality issue.

As I understand the record, Mr. Eibschutz did not use the material to trade. Is everybody in agreement on that? I will look to the CFTC because I think the defense would agree with that.

MR. CHUDY: Your Honor, we have not established any evidence to support that one way or the other. We do know that the record does show that Eibschutz provided the information to a number of his colleagues at his work. We don't know what happened downstream but we are focused on the claims that we charged against these defendants, not what somebody else did with the information.

THE COURT: Is it the CFTC's contention that the

information could still be material if the public would not have viewed it as something that it would want to know in terms of trading? In other words, I understand that it wasn't traded. I don't necessarily -- and again, I haven't looked as closely at the law, I don't necessarily think that that, because it didn't happen, I'm not sure that carries the day fully. It certainly may be an indication and certainly it sounds like Mr. Eibschutz, when he didn't in his own mind, it wasn't for the purposes of trading, but is the legal argument that the CFTC is making is that it doesn't have to be for trading in order for it to be material?

MR. CHUDY: That is correct, your Honor.

I do not believe that we need to establish that somebody actually did trade on the information in order to establish liability. All that is required to be shown is whether or not a reasonable person would have viewed the information as important to a trading decision and we think the Commission regulation 1.59 provides guidance on that.

THE COURT: Okay.

Well, what would be, again, as I understand the information, what is in the record that would support the idea that a reasonable person in the marketplace would consider this information in deciding to make a trade in the commodities area?

MR. CHUDY: Your Honor, as we cited in our October

13th letter there are -- there is deposition testimony regarding witnesses who characterized the -- let me backtrack for a second.

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. CHUDY: In a conversation between Eibschutz and Byrnes, for example, there was a conversation on a recorded line where Eibschutz characterized the information, hey, this is a huge effing trade. And we also have expert testimony to establish the large economic value of the trades that they're discussing and as well as establish reasons we think why somebody would view the information as important to making a trading decision irrespective of whether or not that actually did or did not occur.

THE COURT: Although, I guess in the context of that statement, was that in connection with the trade that had occurred? Is that right? In other words it wasn't a statement that this could lead to a big trade because of the information, it was the trade that was made was a big trade and that the disclosure, whatever they were, the disclosure therefore was that the trade was made for a certain quantities.

MR. CHUDY: I think that's correct, your Honor. A lot of the trades that were captured on audio recordings pertained to options so they would be exercised or expired at some point in the future. So, they do give some indication about where market participants may or may not be in the future.

THE COURT: Just with regard to the options question because I think -- well, let me ask this. With regard to the options question, is there evidence in the record as to when the options were -- in other words, is part of the disclosure something about when the exercise date was for the options?

MR. CHUDY: Your Honor, the specifications of the contracts, the types of contracts that were disclosed, that is something that I think are standardized and available on the NYMEX website. So, if you disclose a particular type of trade you can go look on the website and figure out when it would expire, for example.

THE COURT: Because I guess I view it in sort of different buckets, right? There are the trades that have trades and as I understand, and correct me if I am not accurate in terms of what the record shows, there were disclosures that related to trades that were actually done. Is that accurate?

MR. CHUDY: That's correct; and mostly options trades. So, if a trade was, somebody purchased an option yesterday, that holder of that option has a right to either buy or sell a commodity product in the future.

THE COURT: Okay.

So, the disclosure, in essence, was X individual or identity was purchasing has option to purchase however much of a particular commodity; is that correct?

MR. CHUDY: They vary, Judge, but yes, that's the

general concept.

THE COURT: Let me ask this and actually this is for the defense. Options, right? It seems to me there is a difference in kind between a sale that has occurred -- well -- and a sale that may occur in the future. In other words, when you are talking about -- because now I am parsing between, and I understand what the CFTC is saying they don't have to show that in fact there was a trade but what I am talking about now is would it be public and would someone be interested in knowing that an individual is poised to or could be trading in the future based upon an option?

Yes?

MR. HOGAN: Judge, Albert Hogan for NYMEX.

All of the trades at issue here relate to executed trades. Then, in these markets, you can trade futures contracts.

THE COURT: I see. They trade the options.

MR. HOGAN: You are trading the options so the futures contract itself is a contract that, in the future, will allow -- will require the delivery of a certain commodity. The option is just another contract that allows you to purchase a futures contract in the future.

So, Judge, really all of it relates to fully executed trades with respect to market positions that may accrue out in the future but the point here is unlike an equity trade, in

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some respects even more like an equity trade but even more so in the commodities market knowing one piece of one market participant's past executed trade, you have no idea what the overall positions are. They may be long. They may be short. This maybe to unwind a position. This may to put a position on. It may be a pure hedging transaction. It may be speculation. It may be a trade related to correlated markets.

The fact is these markets are extremely complicated and to get sort of back to the discussion here, there are hundreds of calls, hundreds of disclosures of information and to answer your question directly, the comment about there was a large trade that is absolutely backward-looking, there is not one piece of evidence in the record where any of the people that were engaged in these disclosures said, wow, based on this someone could go out and take the following position in the I'm going to use this information to convince somebody to go take this position in that market. That discussion is completely absent. And, Judge, I suppose in perhaps the only respect that is the benefit of having all of these disclosures, it shows you that these folks, when they were making the disclosures, were not thinking about future trades in the sense of using this information to trade, no discussion of convincing people too trade, no discussion of receiving money based on people using information to trade. These were chatter about past trades so that the broker could call those people and try

and take their business from one broker who was brokering with NYMEX, to himself.

THE COURT: As I understand it there may not be case law necessarily in the commodities area. Is there case law that discusses this type of disclosure, in other words the disclosure of an option trade and in terms of whether or not, in terms of materiality?

MR. HOGAN: Judge, we are not aware of case law specifically addressing the disclosure of a prior trade as whether or not that meets the materiality standard in regulation 1.59. We do believe that the general case law around insider trading, first of all in the SEC context you need to have actual trading.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. HOGAN: So we think the record here, where there is the absence of any trading and the action of any discussion about how trading could occur, does play into the case law about why trading is a required element under the SEC version.

THE COURT: Just to be clear -- I apologize for interrupting but -- just to be clear, everybody agrees, I want to make sure, that there does need to be -- in other words that a reasonable person, in deciding whether to make a particular trade, in other words that trading, some idea of trading, whether it is explicit trading or not, would be a requirement of the materiality provisions here, in other words, that there

needs to be that aspect of it.

MR. CHUDY: Yes, your Honor. There is the commission regulation speaks to that as well and has some nonexclusive list of examples where the Commission has viewed that information as material.

If I may respond to one point that Mr. Hogan had indicated about no evidence in the record? There is testimony from a trader who complained that his information was disclosed and he was asked about why he thought this information, why he might be harmed from it and he had testified that he could get "run over" by someone in the marketplace.

So, there is a real risk of harm and other evidence in the record that could establish how, why this information would be important to this hypothetical reasonable.

THE COURT: Let me see if I have any additional questions. The other issue is the scienter issue.

MR. ABERNETHY: Your Honor, may I comment on Mr. Chudy's comments?

I think it may not be entirely responsive to the Court's inquiry. The central issue, obviously, is materiality and there is a long line of case law in the commodities and securities world that holds that the definition is as you articulated, the information has to be important to a reasonable trader contemplating trading a commodity interest but the Commission, I think, is urging the Court to adopt a

different reading of CFTC Regulation 1.59 and that is that list of items relating to, in the second sentence of 1.59 (a)(5) and they list current and anticipated futures positions, trading strategies and the financial condition of a firm, is material information. So, they're expanding that definition because they are arguing, as I understand it, that even if this information about a current or anticipated futures position is not of importance to a trader in making a decision to trade a commodity interest, that this information is material.

So, I think they're expanding or trying, proposing that this Court expand the definition of materiality and in so doing they are reversing decades' old interpretations by the Commission of its own regulation which is simply that it is material information, simply information that would be important to a trader.

This is, in our view, an unconsidered, expedient litigation posture and unpersuasive interpretation of Regulation 1.59.

THE COURT: I apologize for interrupting because that,
I mean you stated it, that's sort of the question I was getting
at. In other words, is it the position — because I think as
you stated, is it the CFTC's position that absent the trading
aspect of it that there still is an argument for the
information being material? In other words, I think as
Mr. Abernethy just articulated in referring to the list of

items under 1.59, is it the CFTC's position that the fact that it involves sort of a position of an entity and the like, even if it wouldn't be necessarily something that a reasonable person would be interested in in terms of trading, that that is still material? In other words without that trading aspect of it?

MR. CHUDY: Your Honor, with respect to Commission Regulation 1.59, again, we think the plain language speaks for itself. It does define material information as information that would be important to a reasonable investor making a trading decision. That language is there. Counsel is asking you to completely ignore the second sentence that illustrates information that the Commission has traditionally viewed as examples of that sort of information and I think the reference to the Commission rule writing process that Mr. Abernethy is referring to relates to a discussion on a separate aspect called linked exchanges.

So, there was a debate about this Commission rule to determine whether or not to add certain categories of information to this definition or to exclude it. So, for example, with respect to margin, there was a discussion whether or not the word "margin" should be added to the definition in the second sentence and the Commission considered the fact that they should not include it so market participants had indicated that having that language in there would suggest that it would

always be considered material. By contrast, with the linked exchange sentence that Mr. Abernethy refers to, I think there were also some discussion about whether or not that type of information would typically be considered important to making a trading decision and the Commission decided to keep that language in there and had indicated with respect to that component that you still need to establish materiality with respect to it being reasonable to -- excuse me, with respect to information being important to a reasonable investor in making a trading decision.

So, I don't think we are being inconsistent. We are asking the Court to look at the plain language of the regulation. To the extent that that doesn't persuade you, your Honor, we have cited evidence in the record to establish, independent of the reading of the regulation, why we believe that materiality is established, and if it is not an issue for summary judgment then it is — materiality — is typically a question of fact.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ABERNETHY: Your Honor, I think the context in which the Commission reiterates its position on the definition of materiality used in 1.59 is irrelevant. And indeed, yes, I was referring to that comment but I am also referring to the comment in the notice of proposed rulemaking in 1985 which I shouldn't say again because that predates the 1993 statement

that we are talking about. They, again, state what their definition of materiality is.

If I may, your Honor, I would like also to make a comment about the individual who said he might be run over. When he made that comment he had only heard rumors that information about his trading had been disclosed and his comment was if they knew my position, I could be run over.

THE COURT: Overall position.

MR. ABERNETHY: Overall position, or maybe a position in a particular structure or something like that. And we can argue about whether or not that is important to a trader. Evidently to that trader his view is it is. But, the information that was disclosed here was not about positions, it was about price, quantity, structure and the trader.

So, it is a little bit misleading to say that the comment by this trader is evidence of the importance of the information that was disclosed.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. ALLGOR: Your Honor, I might add, I am pretty sure that same witness later on, when confronted with the precise nature of the disclosures said, oh yeah, that's not useful for running me over in later testimony.

THE COURT: So, obviously I think I will need to have all of this before me. Let's talk a little bit about -- I mean, as I understand the -- it seems too me that obviously

materiality is going to be an issue. The issue of scienter is going to be an issue. It also seems to me that as we discussed, the vicarious liability is going to be an issue for the reasons that we have had a discussion on. It sounds like there is not a substantial amount of case law, at least in this specific context. Obviously I would expect the parties, to the extent that if there are analogous situations, that the parties can point to in the SEC context and otherwise -- and I recognize the law may not be perfect analogy -- they should absolutely do that.

Now, in terms of briefing, and in particular I would like to make a comment about 56.1 statements and by my comments I am not saying that any of the parties would do this, but I ask you to pay careful attention to what 56.1 is about. It is about facts and disputed facts, not about arguments, not about anything else.

So, it is to aid me in reaching a decision and in that way saying what facts are in fact not disputed. I have, at times, had parties submit -- well, I will give you the most egregious example, where a party in a 56.1 statement -- and there could be circumstances where this happens but I think it should be rare -- where every single fact was disputed even within large parts of it and then, within that, there are also citations to the record that didn't support the fact that they were certain. And so, what it caused us to have to do,

although I wonder whether I really even needed to, but it causes actually having to go literally check every single thing that was cited in order to get to the bottom of this.

So, the only reason why I raise it is it is an unbelievably helpful aid to us in parsing through the record and knowing what facts are not disputed. Having said that, I recognize that you are obviously — this is an adversarial process so I am not expecting you to agree to a fact that clearly you don't believe is undisputed, but I just ask you to pay careful attention to the purpose of 56.1 and to the extent — obviously, I am not limiting you to make your arguments in the appropriate places but — let me put it to you this way. If, in fact — you shouldn't, and I don't want to invite more pages, but you shouldn't use the fact that the 56.1, I think — am I correct, there is nothing in our individual rules that limit the size of a 56.1.

So, look. If you need more pages, obviously, ask for more pages. And don't use 56.1 to make statements because you couldn't fit it in your brief or something like that. Again, I am not saying that any of the parties here would but that shouldn't be a reason for it. And, again, I am in no way suggesting that any counsel here would do that but it is sort of preventive on my part.

Yes, Mr. Abernethy?

MR. ABERNETHY: Your Honor, maybe this is not the

appropriate time but you have not mentioned anything about the Daubert motions that some of us have proposed.

THE COURT: Let me ask you this. In connection with the summary judgment motions, and I know there are references to experts in the parties' papers, is the intention of the parties to rely on their experts in connection with the summary judgment motions?

MR. ABERNETHY: Your Honor --

THE COURT: Let me hear from the CFTC first and then I will hear from the defense.

MR. CHUDY: Your Honor, in connection with an affirmative motion I would anticipate that we would not. I think it was more of a textual argument that we made under the plain language of the regulation. To the extent we were to oppose the summary judgment we would like to obviously reserve the right to rely on an expert there.

THE COURT: So not affirmatively but perhaps, if need be, in response to arguments that the defense makes on their summary judgment motions; is that accurate?

MR. CHUDY: That's correct, your Honor. And we would also point out further that to the extent summary judgment is based on having sufficient evidence, I think we can establish materiality without relying on it and we think that expert motions are premature at this point but we will take direction from your Honor as to how to approach that.

THE COURT: Let me hear from defendants.

Mr. Abernethy?

MR. ABERNETHY: Your Honor, we absolutely are going to depend on our expert Robert Silvay who is an individual with more than 20 years of experience as a trader and a broker in the natural gas and crude oil energy markets. He has testified unequivocally that the information that was disclosed would not be useful to a trader, that the knowledge that came from these disclosures would not enable a person to determine whether a position was being put on, taken off, increased, decreased, what future trading intentions might be revealed, or if any intervening trades had taken place.

So, we absolutely depend upon Mr. Silvay's testimony for establishing that the information that was disclosed is not material.

With respect to the Commission's expert, we feel that he should be disqualified because he admitted in his own testimony that if he had the information he wouldn't know what to do with it and he stated, also, that only a trader would know whether or not this information is important in considering whether or not to trade a commodity interest. Consequently, we feel that any testimony that he might offer or that the Commission might choose to use in a motion would be inadmissible and shouldn't be considered by the Court. If the Commission would be willing to go one step further and say that

they would not use his testimony -- which apparently they have some -- don't have a great deal of confidence in or I think they would have used it more in their letters -- but if they would be willing to stipulate that not only would they not use it to support their own motion for summary judgment but not use it in opposition to summary judgment motions made by the defendants, then we would be willing to postpone our motion to disqualify him. But, if they intend to use that testimony in their motion for summary judgment or in opposition, then we would like to make that motion to disqualify him at this time.

THE COURT: Okay.

From what I heard the CFTC saying was that -- and I suspect the response is going to be, well, we don't know exactly what the motions are going to look like so we can't say exactly what we are going to say in response but at least I heard them say, let me just confirm, that in connection with the affirmative motion that you would make that the CFTC wasn't planning on relying on its expert in connection with that.

MR. CHUDY: That is correct, your Honor; and I think your characterization of our position is accurate. We obviously vehemently disagree with the characterizations by Mr. Abernethy. Our expert, Dr. Hank Bessembinder, has repeatedly been qualified as an expert in numerous trading matters including cases that have been in the press, Oystacher and Coscia, and to the extent they're taking out sound bytes to

try to make the testimony look bad at this point are taken out of context and completely disregard his methodology that he used to express his opinions.

THE COURT: Let me put it to you this way. My inclination is not to make a ruling on the -- and I will hear from the parties on this -- not to make a ruling on the motion, the Daubert motions. This is just an observation but if you need to, if what you are left with resorting to is experts battling back and forth that might be an indication that perhaps it is not an issue that necessarily is ripe for summary judgment, putting aside whether or not that expert is going to be able to testify in a trial. I mean, I am speaking a little bit in the dark here because I don't know exactly what the actual summary judgment briefing is going to look like and what the actual testimony that the expert is being offered to support is or to rebut a particular summary judgment argument.

So, that's my initial thought; that I would proceed with the summary judgment. If I, in reviewing the papers it occurs to me that, boy, I need to get more information on the experts, I will ask for that, in other words make a ruling on that.

Do any of the parties see any issue with the way I intend to proceed? I understand the desire to deal with the -- but it is not even clear to me -- well, let me ask this, actually. Mr. Abernethy, you did indicate that you intend to

rely on your expert. In the affirmative motions by the other defendants do you also intend to rely on experts that you have? Perhaps this is an easier way.

What is the CFTC's position with regard to the expert that Mr. Abernethy has put forward or any other -- in other words is there Daubert challenges to Mr. Abernethy's and other experts?

MR. CHUDY: Yes, your Honor, I anticipate there would be but it is something that could be dealt with later on. If the sole piece of evidence that Mr. Abernethy relies on is an expert to try to establish confidentiality then I would imagine that we may try to challenge that but there is ample evidence in the record to show that there is a question of — assuming you credit his expert, there are issues of fact that won't necessitate doing that until trial.

either simultaneous or to take care of the Daubert issue at this stage. I will take a look at the summary judgment papers, as I said, and I am skeptical that if what is happening is a battle of experts, that that would be something that would necessarily be ripe. And I haven't looked again at the case law to ferret out when cases are faced with this situation on summary judgment where what you have boils down to a battle of experts. Don't get me wrong, there may be situations in that context where you do need to make the Daubert ruling because

one side or the other is not appropriate expert testimony. So, I am not precluding that issue but where there are experts that appear to be just at loggerheads, that might be an indication that perhaps it is not ripe for summary judgment. But, I'm not going to schedule briefing on the Daubert motion at this stage.

Have the parties discussed timing of briefing and sequencing of briefing? I see a chart, Mr. Chudy. Is that a --

MR. CHUDY: It is a calendar, your Honor. The parties have discussed a briefing schedule generally and I don't want to speak for everyone else, but I think we had anticipated proposing certain dates and, again, counsel can speak up if I am not characterizing this correctly, but December 15th for opening motions; February 15th for opposition to; and March 17th for replies. We had not gotten into the level of detail to discuss sequencing but I am happy to take direction from your Honor on that as well.

THE COURT: Let's first talk in terms of the dates that were just indicated. So, the 15th for opening. Does that work for all defense counsel?

MR. FITZGERALD: Yes, your Honor. I believe so.

If I might, just so we are clear because Mr. Abernethy flagged a motion, the Daubert motion, he wanted to make sure they were for NYMEX, we want to address the issue of vicarious liability which we think is critical and we think it might moot

the second motion, but the other motion we intend to address is summary judgment on the injunctive relief. In our view where there is vicarious liability we think injunctive relief is inappropriate. If we are going to make a no-name illusion to occurring events, like telling an NFL owner that one of his players are actually kicking it, despite being told not to, that the owner is in contempt. In our view we don't think NYMEX should be held vicariously liable for what employees did against the rules, but to invoke an injunctive relief from a Court which would imply strict liability, that if another employee broke the rules that we would be in contempt of Court we don't believe would be appropriate.

So, when we frame the motion we envision having that motion as well as the vicarious liability motion.

THE COURT: I think that was something that was in your correspondence.

MR. FITZGERALD: Yes.

THE COURT: That's fine, and I think that that makes sense. So, 12/15 is okay, and then the opposition would be February 15th, and then replies the 17th of March.

Okay. Sequencing. I was thinking about this earlier and trying to figure out how to limit amount of paper but I am not sure what the best way would be. I mean I know that there are times when some of my colleagues direct that you try and file a joint brief. I am not sure how much, necessarily

effective that would be but I am not sure -- did the defendants have any thoughts in this area? Had you discussed whether or not, and particularly whether it is the individual defendants and NYMEX, have you discussed whether there is a means where there could be a brief? There obviously is overlap in many of the issues and so what I am trying to avoid is the need for people to be repeating the same arguments.

Mr. Fitzgerald.

MR. FITZGERALD: Speaking for NYMEX, I think we would all like to avoid needless duplication for vicarious liability and injunctive relief. That is our issue. We understand there are other issues that we may not join in in a giant brief. We would like to do that, if we can.

THE COURT: I think that's the way we should proceed rather than forcing the parties to basically submit unified briefs. I am still learning in this job and it may be in a year or two years, or maybe even six months after I get your briefs that I want to have it combined, but I think that's fine.

So, obviously, be in touch with one another so you recognize what the arguments are and it is fine to do -- I know Mr. Shechtman is going to do a me too but joining in others' briefing is fine and I think that makes sense. So that you can each file your own papers but it may be that on certain arguments you say I am joining in on the argument whether it is

vicarious liability or the materiality argument, Mr. Fitzgerald for some of the individuals, I understand that would be fine so you don't need to fully brief that out.

Is there anything else that we have to deal with today? From the CFTC?

MR. CHUDY: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: From the defense?

MR. ABERNETHY: No, your Honor.

MR. FITZGERALD: Your Honor, I guess there is one question in terms of if we are going to be doing materiality briefing on the case. We don't have a clear understanding of whether if this goes to trial whether we are looking at 90 violations in front of a jury or 527 or 72.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. FITZGERALD: So, it would be useful to know what we are shooting at. It goes to materiality if whether we are taking each data point as separate violations or a collection of data points as one violation. We don't want to shoot at the wrong target in our brief.

THE COURT: I saw reference in your letter to different points in time so let me ask the CFTC, is it nailed down to the 90? I know that is a reference in the pre-motion letter.

MR. CHUDY: Your Honor, in the pre-motion letter the reference to 90 was the 90 instances of audio recordings for

example and each audio recording may have had multiple disclosures on that and I think we made that quite clear in response to interrogatories served by NYMEX that we were counting violations by disclosure of counter-party trade. So, for example, on one audio recording, if Byrnes or Curtin made a disclosure to Eibschutz about five trades there is multiple disclosures on that call, it is not just the one audio recording. So, I think we have explained that and our position is that we are taking, counting each separate disclosure as a violation. We are happy to discuss with NYMEX further to try to, as they say, pin down what they're shooting at.

THE COURT: I think that makes sense.

Look, I think what needs to happen is -- and it may be that there is an entire agreement that within the 90, it sounds like that is the -- it is within those 90 calls; is that accurate?

MR. CHUDY: That is accurate, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. So, within that there may be multiple times when there were disclosures so I don't know, Mr. Fitzgerald, whether it is 90, whether that answered the question. In other words, as I understand counsel for the CFTC it is those 90 recorded calls. There may be multiple disclosures within that. If the 90 isn't sufficient I ask the parties to meet and confer, well, on call one we have three disclosures. In other words, do you need more than that I

guess is the question.

MR. FITZGERALD: I think what I would like to do is confer with the CFTC and counsel.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. FITZGERALD: I don't think we have enough for what we need but I also don't want to try to figure that out on our feet in your Honor's courtroom now.

MR. ABERNETHY: Your Honor, we agree with that as well.

THE COURT: Because I think this is something that sounds like the parties can work out, in other words, and figure out what is in play and what is not in play. In particular — and this is the reason I think why it can be important. It may be that there may be an argument that with regard to 30 of the calls — I mean, there may be differences between, in the disclosures themselves so it is important for the parties to have a sense of that and if you are actually going to ask me to go disclosure by disclosure and make rulings, and I don't know whether that's the case, you need to be on the same page as to what the disclosures are.

MR. CHUDY: Understood, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay? All right.

Anything else? CFTC?

MR. CHUDY: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: From the defense?

MR. FITZGERALD: No, your Honor. THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much for coming in and we will stand adjourned.